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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FRANK TAYLOR and MARGARET S.
GARNER, d/b/a FRANK TAYLOR
AND GARNER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.
9119

vs.
LEE L. DAHL,
Defendant and Appellant,

PETER W. HUMMEL,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent disagrees with the Statement of Facts set
forth by the Appellants and therefore invites the court's attention to the evidence and record in the following particulars.
For purposes of convenience, Plaintiffs and Appellants
will hereinafter be referred to as Garner, and Defendants
and Appellant Lee L. Dahl, will hereinafter be referred to as
Dahl and Respondent will be referred to as Hummel.
.3
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Garner brought an action below against Dahl for a claimed
real estate commission. She joined Hummel in the action and
admits that she has held $10,000.00 deposited by him in connection with a claimed sale of real property. Garner alleged
she was entitled to $3,750.00 as real estate commission and
asked, in addition thereto, for attorneys fees. She deposited
$6,250.00 with the court, stating that the court should determine the respective claims of herself, Dahl and Hummel and
order the last sum paid to such parties as the court should
determine were entitled to it (R. 1, 2 & 3).
Garner claimed she was entitled to the commission and
attorneys fees by reason of an alleged contract attached to
the Complaint (R. 4).
Hummel admitted he had deposited $10,000.00 with
Garner and that his signatures on the alleged contract were
genuine but claimed he was entitled to the return of his money
and that the claims of Garner and Dahl were without right

(R. 5 & 6).
By way of counterclaim, Hummel contended that the deposit was made with the understanding that plans and specifications detailing the finish work to be done, were to have been
procured and agreed upon and attached to the alleged contract.
He contended that no satisfactory plans and specifications
were ever procured and the alleged contract shows upon its face
that no ·agreement had ever been reached by the parties (R.
6 & 7).
To the Complaint Dahl answered and counterclaimed
agreeing with Garner's contention that a contract had been
entered into by himself and Hummel, but claiming that he
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was alone entitled to the $10,000.00, plus $5,000.00 punitive
damages and attorneys fees (R. 9-12).
Dahl also cross-complained against Hummel, claiming
the $10,000.00 as liquidated damages, $3,000.00 additional
damages and $2,500.00 attorneys fees (R. 17-19).
To this cross-complaint, Hummel :filed his Answer (R.
21-23). Various defenses were set up, but the only one before
the court in this appeal was that "the initial proposal that plans
and specifications for the completion of said home and premises
never came about, nor was any agreement reached with respect
thereto; that this agreement was a specific condition precedent
to said written document; that the two Defendants at no time
have had a meeting of the minds and no contract has ever
been entered into by and between said parties" (R. 23).
The depositions of Dahl, Garner and Hummel were taken
and are a part of the record on appeal. After the pre-trial conference, all parties filed motions for summary judgment, which
were fully argued, and the court granted counsel on both sides
alleged contract attached to Plaintiff's Complaint entitled him
to judgment as a matter of law. The contentions of the parties
were fully argued, and th court granted counsel on both sides
an opportunity to submit briefs. After due consideration, the
court denied the motions of Garner and Dahl and granted
the motion for summary judgment of Defendant Hummel (R.
30). Thereafter, Garner and Dahl filed their Notice of Appeal
to the Supreme Court from the summary judgment entered in
favor of Hummel. They have not appealed from the order
of the court below denying their motions for summary judg-
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ment (R. 31) . The judgment rendered by the court was made
upon the pleadings, depositions and exhibits.
In the Appellants' Brief, the court's attention has been
directed to certain portions of the depositions on file in this
case. Respondents also desire to call the court's attention to
certain significant portions of the depositions of the parties
and will adopt the method used in citing the depositions which
was used in the Appellant's Brief, to-wit:
Margaret S. Garner will be cited as "G," followed by the
page reference; Peter W. Hummel will be cited as "H," followed by the page reference, and Lee L. Dahl will be cited
as "D," followed by the page reference.
In the latter part of October or the first part of November,
1958, Hummel contacted Garner for the purpose of having
her assist him in finding a home in Salt Lake City. After some
investigation of various homes, they looked at the home in
question, situated at 5834 Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City,
Utah. When Hummel met Dahl for the first time, Hummel
asked Dahl for the plans and specifications on the home. At
pages 22 and 23 of the deposition of Dahl, we find the following questions and answers:

"Q. Was any request made for plans and specifications
at that time?
"A. Yes.

"Q. Did Mr. Hummel make any request of you for
plans and specifications then, speaking of your
first meeting?
"A. If I can remember the conversation, it was something like this:

6
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He said, 'Do you have any plans and spec's for
this?'
I said, 'I have got somewhat of a set of plans.
They are not complete because I have never planned on selling the home . . . '
He then said he would like to have some spec's
and plans. I told him I would draw up a set of
spec's and furnish him a set of plans I already
had."
After the alleged contract sued upon had been signed by
Hummel, Garner obtained the signature of Dahl and asked
that he prepare a set of specifications (G. 23-24). He then prepared some 15 pages of form specifications as set forth in Exhibit
"D-4," attached to the Deposition of Dahl. These were signed
by him and delivered by Garner to Hummel with the request
that he sign the same. Hummel at that time indicated
his unwillingness to sign the proposed specifications for the
reason that he had not even read them (G. 36). It is admitted
that he has at no time ever signed or accepted these writings
and has refused to sign and deliver them back.
As to the plans at page 18 of Mrs. Garner's deposition,
we find the following questions and answers:

"Q. Now Mrs. Garner, we come to the part of the
transaction as it pertains to the plans and specifications. Were there any plans of this property ever
furnished to you by Mr. Dahl ?
"A. No, the blueprint plans if that is what you mean.

"Q. Yes, drawing that we commonly know in the
construction buildings as plans that would show
a diagram and so on of the building, either built
or to be built.
7
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"A. No.

"Q. Have you ever seen any plans?
"A. The only blueprints I have seen are the kitchen
blueprints and bathroom blueprints.

"Q. But not of the house itself?
"A. No.

"Q. I suppose it is your testimony that you have never
furnished any of this type of document to Mr.
Hummel?
"A. I have never seen any.

"Q. And from that, I assume that you have never furnished any to Mr. Hummel, would that be correct?
"A. How could I furnish them if I hadn't seen them?

"Q. I understand. I just wanted to make the record
clear. I assume from that, that you have never
furnished them?
"A. If I have never seen them, I couldn't have."
It is nowhere contended in any of the testimony or in any
place of the pleadings that any plans of any sort were furnished to Hummel or that any plans have ever been attached
to the alleged contract being sued upon.
The pre-trial order entered by the court frames certain
issues to be resolved at the time of the trial. However, at the
pre-trial conference, all parties stated they wished to have a
hearing before the trial date on each of their respective motions for summary judgment. No objections were made by
either party to the hearing of the court on the legal sufficiency
of the documents and writings and no contention was ever
8
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made by the Appellants to the court below; that the issue
of the legal sufficiency of the alleged contract could not be
heard on the motion for the summary judgment, for the reason
that it was outside of the pre-trial order or otherwise.
The various motions were fully argued and written briefs
were submitted and the court entered its summary judgment
in favor of the Defendant Hummel.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
In connection with this appeal, Respondent contends:
1. The court properly held as a matter of law that Respondent Peter W. Hummel was entitled to a summary judgment:
A. As a matter of law, the alleged contract, entitled
"Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase," is not a
binding contract upon the parties.
B. Any issue of fact between the parties as to whether
there was a misrepresentation in connection with the
purported agreement is not before this court because no
binding contract existed between the parties as a matter
of law.
C. There is no question of fact to be determined
as to whether a binding contract between the parties
existed.

9
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ARGUMENT
Point 1.
The court properly held as a_ matter of law that Respondent
Peter W. Hummel was entitled to a summary judgment:
A. As a matter of law, no binding contract existed
between the parties in the form of the Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase.
The argument of Respondent on the motion for
summary judgment was- founded on the proposition that
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase signed
by Hummel and Dahl was not, in fact or law, a legally
binding agreement. Hummel contends that the alleged
contract was not complete upon its face, but that it was
lacking a material element without which it could not
be legally binding.
The document in part provides:
"Seller agrees to finish said home and premises in
accordance with attached plans and specifications at
his expense . . . ''
Hummel contends that said document is not binding
for the reason that, in fact, the plans and specifications
so required by the alleged contract were never furnished
by Dahl or attached to the document sued upon. The fact
that plans were never furnished is pointed out by Dahl
in the following testimony given at the taking of his
deposition:

"Q. (By Mr. Kirton) Do you know whether any plan
of this property was ever submitted to Mr. Hum10
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mel by anyone? We speak of two things here today. We have spoken of plans and also spoken of
specifications. I am now speaking about the plans.
"A. (By Dahl) No. I don't believe there was ever a
set of plans given to him. I don't believe I gave
any to Mrs. Garner. I am almost sure I didn't,
because I felt that to give a set of plans out with
the home the way it had been changed, was a
detriment rather than to have the home as it set,
because no one could look at the plans and get the
true picture and it was smalled than what it ended
up with" (D. 48).
Nor were plans and specifications ever attached to
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase as required. This fact is acknowledged by Appellants. (See
Appellants' Brief, page 25).
The alleged contract sued upon said Seller would
finish the home in accordance with attached plans and
specifications. In fact, no plans and specifications were
ever attached, and it is admitted no plans were ever furnished, nor were any specifications furnished, and
therefore the alleged contract is indefinite in its terms as
to a material element and is not legally binding.
In 12 Am. Jur. 554-555, Sec. 64, we find this statement
of law:
"An agreement to be binding must be definite and
certain. It is evident that courts can neither specifically
enforce agreements nor award substantial damages for
their breach when they are wanting in certainty. Damages canont be measured for the breach of an obligation
when the naL,'re nad extent of the obligation are unknown, being neither certain nor capable of being made
certain.n
11
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In the case of Cannaday vs. Martin, Tex. Civ. App.
98 S. W. 2nd 1009, at page 1012, the court said, quoting
with approval Williston on Contract:
"A promsie to erect buildings where the dimensions
and plans are not specified, or which refers to plans
as part of a contract though no plans and specifications
are attached . . . are all to vague, and are not of sufficient definiteness . . . to be enforceable."
See Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, Vol. I, pp.
135-140, par. 42. Also, The Aimini Company v. Charles
H. King, 92 Ill. App. 276.
In the Washington case of Wildon et al. vs. Degnan,
150 p. 1184, the court was asked to award liquidated
damages on the breach of an alleged contract to form
a corporation. The alleged contract provided for the
purpose of the corporation the amount of the capital
stock, and the proportion in which it was to be contributed.
The court held the agreement not sufficiently definite
in its terms to be binding. Among the reasons ascribed for
this holding were that there was nothing in the agreement
to bind a majority of the subscribers to the organization
of the corporation under the laws of any certain state if
they were unwilling or refused to consent thereto.
Similarly, in the case before the court there is nothing
in the alleged contract to bind either of the parties thereto
as to what was to be done to complete the home. What,
for example, could the court require Dahl to do in completion of the home as the alleged contract stands?
Hummel would be helpless to compel Dahl to do any12
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thing without an agreement before hand as to what Dahl
would do.
The Washington Court in the Wildon case treated
this problem of definiteness by citation of the case of
Rudiger vs. Coleman, 112 App. Div., 279, 89 N. Y. Supp.
461. In that case, there was an agreement that:
"A corporation shall be formed ... in accordance
with a certificate and by-laws, a copy of which by-laws

is hereto attached."
The New York Court in an action brought on this agreement stated:
"The judgment cannot be sustained . . . annexed
to the agreement there is a proposed set of by-laws,
but they contain little if anything, showing the terms
and details of the proposed incorporation. It follows

that the judgment cannot be enforced if the parties
refused to comply with it, and for that reason is objectionable in form and substance."
This reasoning applies squarely to the case at bar. There
is nothing in the Earnest Money Agreement '' . . . showing
the terms and details" for completion of the home for which
$75,000.00 was to be paid. It is unreasonable to suppose that
a man would obligate himself to this extent without knowing
what he was buying and this could not be known without
specifications setting forth the agreement of the parties as
to what each would do and what each could require of the
other.
The court in the Martin case concluded that:
"The so-called contract is no more than an agreement for an agreement, or, in other words, an agree-

13
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ment to do something which requires a further meeting
of the minds of the parties and without which it would
not be complete."
Respondent contends that this language accurately describes the document sued upon in the instant case, i.e.~ it is
an agreement for an agreement. The alleged agreement re~
quired something to be done which was not in fact done, that
is, to furnish and attach plans and specifications. The failure
so to do made the alleged agreement nugatory and not legally
binding.
Appellants, in their first argument, contend that the lower
court could not consider the legal sufficiency of the alleged
contract. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 15-17). They contend that
the question of whether ·the alleged agreement was binding
on its face was not a part of the pre-trial order, therefore
could not be entertained by the court.

;:..

_;

In meeting this argument, Respondent calls the attention
of the court to the following facts as disclosed by the record.
In all of his pleadings as set forth in the statement of
facts, Respondent repeatedly contended that the alleged document was not a· contract between the parties as a matter of
law. In paragraph 7 of the original counterclaim, the Respondent alleged that the Exhibit "A," attached to Plaintiffs'
Complaint, shows upon its face that no agreement has ever
been reached by the parties. In his answer to the cross-complaint,
the Respondent set forth an entire affirmative defense to the
effect that plans and specifications for the completion of the
home and premises ever came about and there was no agreement reached with respect thereto, and that the Defendants

14
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Dahl and Hummel, at no time, had a meeting of the minds
and no contract has ever been entered into by and between the
parties.
All parties thereafter filed their respective motions for
summary judgment. The Appellants each earnestly urged the
court that the alleged contract was a contract. as a matter of
law and that no issue of fact remained for the court to consider,
and that therefore each was entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law in their favor.
Likewise, it was the contention of the Respondent that
the alleged contract on its face, and as a matter of law, was
not a binding agreement between the parties. It was argued
by the Appellants that the parol evidence rule would preclude
the introduction of evidence on behalf of the Respondent
concerning any misrepresentation as to the square foot area
of the home or any understanding of the parties to the alleged
contract, to the effect that no plans or specifications had been
furnished to the parties. They controverted each and every
argument advanced by the Respondent in support of his motion.
They argued his motion before the trial court and they submitted written briefs with respect thereto. Nowhere in their
oral argument or in their written briefs did they, at any time,
contend to the court below that Respondent's motion for
summary judgment was not and could not· be before the court
below, for the reason that they have now assigned on appeal
to the effect that it is outside of the framed issues of the pretrial order. The first time this matter has been brought to the
attention of anyone in connection with these proceedings is
in the brief filed by the Appellants. At the pre-trial conference,

15
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each party stated his intention to the court to file a motion
for summary judgment and asked the court to have the case
set down for hearing in advance of the trial date, so that the
motion of the respective parties could be fully heard, because
if the court were to grant any one of the motions for summary
judgment, this would obviate the necessity for trying the issues
of fact set forth in the pre-trial order.

If the Appellants had wished to contend that the legal sufficiency of their alleged contract could not come before the
court, the Appellants had ample opportunity to do so. Certainly
if there had been any question at all regarding the matter,
the Respondent would have had the right to ask the court for
such modification of the pre-trial order as may be necessary to
dead y include within it, the issue presented to the trial court
by the Respondent in support of his motion for summary
judgment. Appellant has cited Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. We likewise cite the rule to the court and
add our own emphasis to the last portion of the rule.
''The court shall make an order which recites the
action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed
to do the pleadings, and the agreements made by the
parties as to any of the matters considered, and which
limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order
when entered controls the subsequent course of the
action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest
injustice."
It is submitted that no unfair advantage has been taken of
the Appellants. The issue of the legal sufficiency of the alleged
contract was raised by the Respondent at every stage of the
pleadings and at the pre-trial conference arrangements were

16
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made to test the legal sufficiency of the documents on behalf
of all parties. The Appellants had ample notice that the Respondent was asking the court to pass upon the legal sufficiency
of this doucment by its motion. Finally, if the Appellants
wished to contend that the pre-trial order precluded any consideration of the legal sufficiency of the document, they were
under obligation to call this matter to the attention of the
court below, because it would be in the discretion of the
trial court to modify the pre-trial order to permit the Respondent to bring the issue, which had existed from the beginning of the action, squarely into the existing issues before
the court.
It is next contended at page 17 of Appellants' Brief that
"no real issue is made of the fact that there were never any
plans attached, because the home was 80 per cent complete and
the plans with design of location of rooms and so forth would
be superfluous (D, 9 and 10). It was the specifications on
how Mr. Dahl proposed to complete the house which gave
Mr. Hummel utmost concern."
Were this argument to be accepted, it would be a direct
violation of the parol evidence rule. An excellent statement of
the law, in this regard, is found in 12 Am. Jur., Contracts,
Sec. 234, page 757:
"Parol Understandings, although they induce the
making of a written contract, are merged in the writing
so that they cannot be used to change the contract or
show any intent different from that expressed in the
instrument."
In the case at bar, we have a situation where the clear and
unambiguous terms of the contract require the providing and
17
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attaching of plans. It is an uncontroverted fact that plans
were never provided, nor were they ever attached. A contention
that they were not needed would vary the clear written provision of the alleged contract, which required that plans be
provided. The statement that plans were not necessary, would
require parol evidence, and parol evidence ·· . . . cannot be
used to change the contract, or show any intent different from
that expressed in the instrument."
A second and very significant observation on this argument
propounded by Appellants, is that in all of the pleadings of
the Appellants, the only alleged contract that has ever been
pleaded, or made a matter of record, is the document marked
Exhibit "A," attached to the Complaint and Cross-Complaint.
This is the disputed Earnest Money receipt and offer to purchase. The significant portion of the typed-in matter says:
"Seller agrees to finish said home and premises in
accordance with attached plans and specifications at
his expense, on or before the 15th day of January,
1959."
Neither of the Appellants bothered to plead any plans
or specifications. They admit that no plans have ever been
furnished. The most that they contend is that the specifications
were furnished that would satisfy the requirements of this
instrument. These are the so-called specifications, marked Exhibit "D-4," consisting of some 15 pagesof principally mimeographed materials prepared by Dahl. Both of the Appellants
admit that there were many matters contained in the so-called
specifications that were never discussed or considered by Hummel, Dahl and Garner. In this connection, Respondent calls
18
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to the Court's attention questions and answers beginning at
page 2 5 of the Deposition of Mrs. Garner.

"Q. Mrs. Garner, I will just ask you a yes or no on this.
Was it your understanding that the parties were
going to finish the house in accordance with what
appears the Exhibit 'D4'?
"A. Yes. When I got the specifications, I did not sit
down and read them item by item. I am not a
building c~>ntractor.

"Q. Of course these matters that are set forth in here
had never been discussed in any detail between
the parties at all, had they?
"A. Well, you can't say it blanket. That is like saying
that everybody is good or everybody is bad. Some
of them had probably and some of them hadn't.

"Q. Undoubtedly, some of them had not.
correct?

Isn't that

(Mr. Nielsen speaking) You may answer if you know.
"A. If I know, let me think, if I know. How much
plaster went~ into the .plastering? How much sand
that hadn't been discussed?

"Q. (By Mr Kirton) Will you take such time as you
will require to go over and examine the specifications, and tell me whether or not all the matters
therein set forth had been discussed and agreed
upon between Hummel and Dahl?
"A. No, they had not all.

"Q. Let me say this. The matter that Mr. Dahl sat and
embodied in this detailed specification here, there
had been no prior meeting between Mr. Hummel
and Mr. Dahl to discuss these matters, had there?
"A. Not all of them."

19
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It will be seen from the excerpt that matters were contained in the so-called specifications which had never been
discussed between the parties. It would seem obvious that
specifications which had never been discussed by the parties
could not satisfy the requirements of the alleged contract.
At most, they were mimeographed forms, hurriedly filled out
by Dahl. To impose them upon Hummel in this condition, before the parties had had any discussion concerning them, would
be a strained and unjustified interpretation of the documents
and of the purpose which they allegedly filled.
It is next contended that nothing is said in the Earnest
Money Agreement to the effect that the specifications to be
furnished were subject to the approval of Mr. Hummel ( Appellants' Brief, p. 25). They say that to permit Hummel by
means of oral testimony to so contend would be in direct
violation of that term of the agreement, which they quote as
follows:
"It is understood and agreed that the terms written
in this receipt, constitute the entire preliminary contract
between the purchaser and seller and that no verbal
statement made by anyone, relative to this transaction
shall be construed to be a part of this transaction,
unless incorporated in writing, herein."

Concerning the proposition urged upon the court that
the specifications to be submitted were not subject to any
approval by Hummel, the Appellants are urging upon the
Court a dilemma having two horns, neither of which can bt
sustained.
The first of these is that the so-called unsigned specifications were simply a written embodiment of an agreement
20
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already reached between the parties. It has been previously
shown that this is not the case; that there were many matters
embodied in the so-called specifications which had never been
discussed or considered by the parties. It is untenable to assert
that the so-called unsigned specifications were simply the
written embodiment of agreement already reached by the
parties.
The other horn of the dilemma is that the alleged contract
is to be construed to the effect that it was entirely within the
discretion of Dahl as to what the specifications should contain
and how the house was to be finished.
It is submitted that to so construe the instrument, would
be for the court to make the contract for the parties, to impose
new additional terms that the parties had never discussed or
agreed upon. Either position is wholly untenable under the law.

However, much more significant than any of the foregoing argument, is the parol evidence rule, cited and discussed
by Respondent elsewhere in this brief (p ? ?) . Counsel for
Appellants have cited the parol evidence rule in support of
their own argument and have called the court's attention to
case handed down by the Tenth Circuit (Nephi Processing
Plant vs. Talbot, 247, Federal 2nd, 771). As Appellants point
out, a provision of the contract provided that the individual
should transport his turkeys to the plant and the individual
contended that he had orally discussed this provision of the
contract with the representative of the processor and was told
that the processing plant paid all but a very nominal portion
of the transportation costs. The Tenth Circuit then held that
this testimony was inconsistent with the provisions of the
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written agreement of the parties. That by unambiguous terms,
in the written instrument, Talbots agreed to deliver the turkeys to the processor at Nephi, Utah. The Court held that
the terms of such a contract cannot be altered, varied or contradicted by parol evidence.
We are satisfied that this is a proper statement of the
parol evidence rule, but in citing this rule and urging it upon
the Court, how can the Appellants be heard to say that parol
evidence may be introduced to prove that the plans and specifications called for in the writing they have sued upon were
not necessary, and that this provision of the written instrument
1s, therefore, to be disregarded by the Court?
We think the statement of the parol evidence ruled by
Professor Ronan E. Degnan, cited by Appellants, is particularly
applicable to the case at bar. We here take the liberty of restating his reasoning.
"This final agreement is the agreement of the parties;
it is the jural act to which the law attributes changes
in legal relationships. In short, the later agreement
supersedes all former. Thus former negotiations or even
agreements are excluded from a trial not because evidence as to their existence would be untrustworthy but
because they are legally immaterial; if their existence
were proved or even admitted it would not affect the
rules of law to be applied in determining the disposition of the case."
Any evidence questionine the requirement of written plans
and specifications to be attached to the alleged contract would
be legally immaterial, as stated by Professor Degnan, for the
reason that the alleged contract supersedes any oral evidence
to the contrary.
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Appellant further contends that Hummel is precluded from
denying the validity of the document sued upon because his
signature appears under line 46 of Exhibit "D-3," which reads:
"I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures." (Appellant's
Brief, pp. 27, 28, 29).
Line 45 of the same document provides that "(State law
requires brokers to furnish copies of the contract bearing all
signatures to Buyer and Seller . . . ) ". This requirement is inserted for the purpose of preventing fraud and misdealing.
It gives the Buyer and Seller a copy of the instrument with
all signatures which cannot then be unilaterally altered. The
satisfying of this requirement in no wise indicates the completeness of a contract or the satisfaction of requirements set forth
in the documents. It merely indicates that the document itself
has been received by the parties.
Secondly, the document of which receipt of a copy was
acknowledged by Hummel, shows on its face that it was not
complete. Hummel actually acknowledged " . . . receipt of a
final copy of the foregoing agreement," which at most is "an
agreement to agree."
B. Any issue of fact between the parties as to whether
there was a misrepresentation in connection with the purported
agreement is not before this court because no binding contract
existed between the parties as a matter of law.
Appellants, at page 30 of their Brief, quote the following
paragraphs from the lower court's pre-trial order:
"1. As an issue of law, may the Defendant Hummel
obtain recision on the ground of misrepresentations
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being made in connection with the square footage of
said home.
"2. In the event said Defendants may raise such
issue, an issue of fact will be whether such misrepresentations were made as to justify recision of the contract" (R. 27}.

They argue that these issues precluded the trial court from
entering a summary judgment in favor of Respondent.
A cursory examination of the quotations reveals the fallacy
of Appellants' argument. The issues framed by the pre-trial
order gave certain rights to Respondent in the event the writing
sued upon was valid on its face. If the Court on the motion
for summary judgment had ruled that the writing was valid
on its face, a judgment for Appellants could not have been
awarded for the reason that Respondent still had the right,
as evidenced by the pre-trial order, to try the issue of fact as
to whether there were other grounds upon which the contract
could be rescinded. This was a right of Respondent, not a right
of Appellants. Appellants do not contend there is an issue of
fact as to whether the alleged contract is binding. It is Respondent who makes this contention. Appellant cannot be heard
to say that the court could not award a summary judgment
to Respondent because the issues raised by Rsepondent had
not been adjudicated.
Appellants raised no issue of fact. Their contention was
that the alleged agreement was binding per se. When the
court determined that the document sued upon was not binding
on its face, Appellants had received an adjudication of their
contention and they cannot now be heard to say that they
have an issue which hasn't been determined.
24
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Secondly, it will be noted that a reading of the pre-trial
order that it is based on the assumption that the document
sued upon was valid upon its face. For example, paragraph 1
speaks of obtaining recision; paragraph 2 speaks of misrepresentation as grounds for recision, etc.
Each paragraph assumes the agreement to be valid on its
face, theri sets up an issue as to whether there are other grounds
upon which it could be declared not binding.
As pointed out hereinabove, Appellants recognized that
the legal sufficiency of the documents sued upon could be tested
on a Motion for Summary Judgment, and, in fact, counsel made
their own motion. The court, upon hearing the motion, determined that the alleged agreement was not binding on its
face, since it was lacking in a material element thereon. This
decision made it unnecessary to proceed to a trial of the issues
framed at the pre-trial conference.
Only if the court had determined that the contract was
binding on its face could issues have been raised as to whether
Hummel could avoid the language thereof by attacking it
collaterally with the argument that it was induced by misrepresentation.
Respondents agree with the Appellants' statement at page
30 of their Brief that "a summary judgment may be granted
when there is no dispute of facts and the matter is clear to
the court that judgment should be granted in accordance with ·
relief prayed for ... " This principal applies squarely to the
case now before the court. There was no issue of fact between
the parties at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment as to whether or not plans and specifications were fur25
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nished and attached to the document sued upon. That they had
not is admitted by Appellants in their Brief at page 25. When
the court heard the argument and determined that there was
no issue of fact as to whether or not the plans and specifications were provided and attached, as required by the alleged
agreement, it declared said document invalid as a matter of
law. The court did not concern itself with the question of
misrepresentation or with the conditions under which misrepresentation would constitute a defense to an action of this
nature. The reason for this was that these issues were not before
the· court on a Motion for Summary Judgment.
C. There is no question of fact to be determined as to
whether a binding contract between the parties existed.
Was the document sued upon binding on its face? Respondent contends that it was not and this was the judgment
of the court below.
Inasmuch as the Court below determined that the document
was not binding on its fact, the question of whether it could
be rescinded because of misrepresentation, etc., became moot.
Furthermore, the court's attention is again called to the
fact that if the document sued on had been adjudged a contract
by the court below, Respondent would have been the one with
the right to thereafter raise issues as to whether it could be
attacked collaterally. In other words, it is Respondent who has
the right to raise an issue of fact and Appellants cannot claim
that the court erred because they did not determine a right
which belonged, not to them, but to Respondent. Clearly,
Appellants are basing their contention on the argument that
the judgment cannot be sustained until all of Respondent's
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rights are determined and they would have the court try issues
which they have never contended exist.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Respondent respectfully requests the Court
to affirm the decision of the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson in
awarding a Summary Judgment for the reasons and upon the
ground that there is no contract between the parties as a matter
of law; the purported contract being too indefinite in its terms
to be enforced.
Further, that the validity of the alleged contract, as a
matter of law, was proper for the Court to determine on a
motion for Summary Judgment, and that the lower court's
determination, that there was no contract between the parties,
as a matter of law, precluded the necessity of trying the issues
framed by the Court in th pre-trial order.
Respectfully submitted,
W. W. KIRTON, JR. and
VERDEN E. BETTILYON
of Kirton and Betti!yon
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondent
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